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8 April 1966

## "CYPRUS" WORLD TROUBLE SPOT

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"CYPRUS"  
World Trouble Spot

by

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8 April 1966



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## SUMMARY

The world has become so accustomed to hearing about trouble in Cyprus that it is not cognizant of the desperate situation, despite the presence of the United Nations peacekeeping force.

Small though it is, the strategic location of Cyprus vis-a-vis Europe, the USSR, and the Middle East, has brought Cyprus to the forefront in present international relations.

Cyprus knew many masters before the British took over the administration in 1878. During the period of British rule, the Greek Cypriots frequently pleaded and demonstrated for their independence and for enosis, the right to unite with Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots argued for partition of the island. Limited independence finally came in 1960, forced by a period of violence and bloodshed between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island, and by the imminent threat of war between Greece and Turkey. An outbreak of violence in 1963, brought about by proposed amendments to the Constitution, threatened the solidarity of the Western Alliance and international peace and security.

Although the Constitution and its enforcing treaties are still the legal governing documents, the constitutional framework is no longer viable.

The problem of Cyprus is now in the hands of the United Nations, with no apparent solution in sight. United Nations forces are stationed in Cyprus to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order on the island.

The present conditions in Cyprus enhance the influence of the Communists, and facilitate Soviet intervention in this eastern Mediterranean trouble spot.

This research paper examines the background and causes of the troubles in Cyprus, and the effects of such troubles on the United States and the World arena.

An analysis is made of the feasibility of utilizing Cypriot security forces to stabilize the political problems of Cyprus to enable Cyprus to achieve a stable and viable state. Conclusions are drawn regarding the problem of Cyprus. Recommendations are made regarding a United States strategic policy that will foster development of Cyprus along lines favorable to United States security interests.



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Ever since World War II faraway places have become the everyday concern of the American Government and people. The island of Cyprus has taken its place as one of those concerns and interests.

The island of Cyprus, situated strategically as it is in the eastern Mediterranean, near the very cradle of civilization, reflects five thousand years of turbulent history.

Sir George Francis Hill, in his work, "The History of Cyprus," cites a statement made by a German archaeologist:

He who would become and remain a great power in the East must hold Cyprus in his hand. That this is true, is proved by the history of the world during the last three and a half millenia, from the time of Thutmes III, of Egypt to the days of Queen Victoria.<sup>1</sup>

Plagued by a history of occupation and internal conflict, the Greek-speaking people of Cyprus revolted against the British colonial administration to win their freedom and the right to unite with Greece, enosis. The Turkish-speaking minority, fearful of subjection to Greek rule, entered the struggle demanding the island be partitioned, taksim.

Bloodshed and violence became widespread on the island and the two ethnic communities grew apart in their relations with one another.

In 1959, agreements reached between Greece, Turkey, and Great

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<sup>1</sup>Sir George Francis Hill, The History of Cyprus, p. 613.



Britain ruling out both partition and union with Greece ended the struggle.

Limited independence came in 1960 when Archbishop Makarios III, President of the Republic, and Dr. Kutchuk, Vice President, accepted the agreements for the Cypriot people, and with it the form and restrictions of governments its terms dictated.

The constitutional framework imposed on the Republic of Cyprus succeeded in dividing the Greek-Turkish relations to the breaking point, when the President moved to abrogate some of the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority.

The outbreak of bitter intercommunal fighting in 1963 brought about a dichotomy in the relationship between Greece and Turkey and between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and posed a grave threat to international peace and security.

The fighting in Cyprus brought the turbulent island into the world arena when the United Nations was called upon to seek a solution to the problem, and to dispatch a peacekeeping force to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order.

United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) became operational in March of 1964. Relative peace and tranquillity prevailed over the island until August 1964, when government forces launched an attack against Turkish Cypriots manning positions on the northern coast. The battle reached crisis proportions when Turkish aircraft commenced bombing Cyprus. A cease fire was accepted and became effective three days later.



Keeping a lid on the Cyprus powder keg is becoming more and more difficult, the longer the impasse exists, the Soviet bloc benefits accordingly with relatively little effort on their part.

Turks and Greeks have stopped shooting at each other--for the time being. But they are still not talking to one another. Mutual distrust hangs heavy over the island. Cold war continues. As far as an outsider can see, no one is the better for it.<sup>2</sup>

This research paper examines the background and causes of the troubles in Cyprus, and the effects of such troubles on the United States and the world arena.

An analysis will be made of the feasibility of utilizing Cypriot security forces to stabilize the political problems of Cyprus to enable Cyprus to achieve a stable and viable state. Recommendations will be made regarding a United States strategic policy that will foster development of Cyprus along lines favorable to United States security interests.

Prior to launching into the problems of Cyprus, a brief portion of this paper is devoted to the island's historical setting, geography, the people, and economy, in order to achieve a full appreciation and understanding of the island.

For administrative purposes and in order to proceed with the writing of this research paper, research was concluded on 17 December 1965. Events which have taken place subsequent to this date were not considered in the development of this paper.

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<sup>2</sup>John Law, "Life on a War-Torn Island," US News and World Report, 31 Aug. 1964, p. 42.



## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Because of its position in the eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus has throughout its history been a point of convergence of the influence of Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and other Mediterranean powers. Being the victim of numerous struggles, Cyprus has changed hands many times, coming under the domination of whichever power controlled the surrounding areas.

Cyprus abounds in ancient monuments in a good state of preservation covering a period of almost six thousand years.

There was a Stone Age riverside civilization in Cyprus around 3700 B.C., and about 1200 years later a Bronze Age people, ploughing with the ox, first exploited the island's copper resources. By 1000 B.C., the island had been colonized by Greeks returning from the Trojan War, and Phoenicians from Asia Minor, only to be conquered successively by the Assyrians, the Pharaohs of Egypt, and the Persians.<sup>1</sup>

Alexander the Great liberated Cyprus in 333 B.C., but on his death Ptolemy of Egypt seized it, and his successor held it until 58 B.C., when on the defeat of Anthony and Cleopatra at Actium, it became a Roman province.<sup>2</sup>

With the fall of the Roman Empire in 395 A.D., the island of

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<sup>1</sup>C. Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus, pp. 5-8.

<sup>2</sup>"The Cyprus Question," The Institute of Greek-American Historical Studies, p. 2.



Cyprus became part of the Byzantine Empire. It was during this period that the Orthodox Church was established among the Greek-speaking inhabitants.<sup>3</sup>

Byzantine power waned, and in 1190 A.D., Richard I of England, on his way to the Third Crusade, seized the island. It later passed to the Lusignan Bynasty.

The Lusignan Dynasty, backed from time to time by the fleets of European rulers, ruled over Cyprus for three centuries, and introduced the Roman Catholic religion. In 1489, the kingdom passed to Venice, then the greatest sea power in the Mediterranean.<sup>4</sup> Venetian rule lasted for about eighty years, until in 1571 the island was occupied by the Turks.

Three centuries of Turkish rule restored the Orthodox Church, and abolished the feudal system. The Christian population was granted a large measure of freedom, but the iron and copper mines were closed, the forest wealth of the island was largely destroyed, and the famous wine trade greatly reduced.<sup>5</sup>

The Turks remained in Cyprus for three centuries until on 4 June 1878, they agreed to the British occupation of the island in exchange for British assistance in their struggles with Russia. However, the island remained nominally part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914, when Turkey entered into war against Britain. On 5 November of that year,

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<sup>3</sup>Charles Foley, Island in Revolt, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup>Philip Newman, A Short History of Cyprus, p. 156.

<sup>5</sup>"Cyprus," Great Britain, British Information Services, p. 1.



Cyprus was annexed to the British Crown. In 1915, Britain offered the island to Greece, with the condition that Greece come to the aid of Serbia, which had been invaded by Bulgaria. Greece refused.<sup>6</sup>

Britain's annexation of Cyprus was recognized by the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne. In 1925, the island was given the status of a Crown Colony of the British Empire. It was administered by a Governor, who was assisted by Legislative and Executive Councils.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Sir Harry Luke, Cyprus, p. 86.

<sup>7</sup>Sir George Francis Hill, The History of Cyprus, p. 427.



## CHAPTER 3

### THE GEOGRAPHY, PEOPLE AND ECONOMY

#### LOCATION AND TOPOGRAPHY

Cyprus, with an area of 3,572 square miles, approximately half the size of New Jersey, is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, exceeded in size by Sicily and Sardinia. It is situated in the northeast corner of that Sea, approximately forty miles south of Turkey, sixty miles west of Syria, five hundred miles southeast of Greece, and 240 miles north of Egypt and the Suez Canal. The island is 140 miles long from east to west, and averages forty miles in width. Its geological composition indicates clearly that Cyprus is a limb of Asia, separated from the mainland by an arm of the sea.<sup>1</sup>

The topography of the island is created by two ridges which once were part of two larger arcs running from the mainland of Asia westward toward Crete. The greater part of these arcs has disappeared, but remnants are found on the eastern mainland, where they form the Cimarrus Range of Turkey, and on Cyprus where they are visible as two mountain systems--the Kyrenia Range of the north, rising to over three thousand feet, and in the south-center an extensive mountain Massif, the Troodos Range, culminates in the 6,400 foot peak of Mount Olympus.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Alastos Doras, Cyprus in History, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>"The Middle East and North Africa 1964-65," Europa Publications Limited, p. 125.



Between these ranges lies a broad fertile plain, the Messaoria, once famous for its forests. The Messaoria extends across the island from Famagusta Bay in the east to Morphor Bay in the west, giving it a length of nearly sixty miles, and a breadth varying from ten to thirty-five miles. The plain has an elevation of less than 750 feet.

The island's coastline is indented and rocky, with long sandy beaches. There are no large rivers, and such rivers as exist are little more than rocky channels which carry away the water during the thaws of spring and early summer.

#### CLIMATE

The climate on Cyprus is strongly "Mediterranean" in character with mild winters and very hot summers. Rainfall is little and occurs only in the winter. Annual rainfall ranges from below twelve inches in the Messaoria to forty inches in the mountains. The summers are long and arid, and all rivers are dry in this season. Drought is common, but the construction of large water reservoirs has alleviated some of this danger.<sup>3</sup>

#### PEOPLE

The population of Cyprus, according to the 1962 registration, is about 591,000, which gave an overall density of about 162 persons per square mile. Its population includes two major ethnic groups,

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

seventy-eight percent Greek Orthodox Cypriots, and eighteen percent Turkish Muslim Cypriots. The Greek majority is found in all areas.<sup>4</sup>

Although the island had known many occupiers when it came under British rule, the majority of its people remained Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, and above all Greek-feeling. When the Turkish forces invaded Cyprus in 1571 the island had no Turkish inhabitants, and those who remain today are the descendants of the Turkish settlers who followed the occupiers.

Traditionally these two principal communities, while intermingled, have remained in many respects distinct and separate. In particular each has followed their respective customs, and maintained separate school systems, at least at the elementary level and at a large part of the secondary level, its own libraries, cooperative societies, newspapers and periodicals, and its own laws, customs, and traditions on such matters as marriage and personal status. Inter-marriage is rare and frowned upon, and each community retains the language of its respective homeland. Both Greek and Turkish are official languages; intercommunal affairs are conducted mainly in English. Government communications addressed to an individual citizen are in his communal language, and the words on coins, currency, and stamps are in both Greek and Turkish.<sup>5</sup> The basic dichotomy between the Turkish Muslim and the Greek Orthodox divides Cypriot society into

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<sup>4</sup>"Cyprus," Statesman's Year Book 1965-1966, p. 504.

<sup>5</sup>US Dept of the Army, Pamphlet 550-22, p. 3 (referred to hereafter as DA Pam 550-22).



two independent social groups.

The emergence of a young, mostly literate population unable to be contained by the old agricultural economy, has been at the root of most of the island's economic and political problems.

### ECONOMY

Cyprus has known periods of great economic well-being, principally due to its geographical position on trade routes linking East and West.

The Cypriot economic system is essentially free enterprise capitalism. Except for the large mining firms, capital invested in the island is provided by local businessmen and goes into small industries.

Agriculture is the backbone of the Cypriot economy, employing over fifty percent of the labor force. The majority of farmers, most of them smallholders, depend wholly or largely on a single crop, such as cereals or vines. There are but few sizeable estates on which crops are grown under the plantation system. Factors creating this situation are tradition, limitations, lack of capital, and fragmentation of land holdings. Most of the arable land lies in the central plain Messaoria.<sup>6</sup>

Agriculture provides about one-third of the domestic production,

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<sup>6</sup>"Basic Data on the Economy of Cyprus," US Dept of Commerce, p. 3.

with approximately 48% of the island's area under cultivation.<sup>7</sup>

During the past decade there has been investment in the irrigation projects, and a fertilizer program, which have increased yields and could make an important contribution to the foreign trade position of Cyprus.

Mining is the island's most important industry, contributing about eight percent of the GNP. Copper and iron pyrites constitute the bulk of the mineral output. Small amounts of asbestos, chromium, gypsum, and umber are also mined.<sup>8</sup> The bulk of the mineral production is exported, with the main exceptions of building stone, limestone, and gypsum for cement. In 1962 mining provided about forty percent of the total exports.<sup>9</sup>

There is no heavy industry on Cyprus. The principal light industries are in large towns and concerned mostly with agricultural products, such as wines and vegetable oils, which are exported.<sup>10</sup>

The establishment of a development bank in 1963 has given impetus to industrial activity. "Manufacturing industry in 1963 contributed about thirteen percent to the gross domestic product and gave employment to fourteen percent of the economically active population."<sup>11</sup>

The Cypriot economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade to

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<sup>7</sup>"The Middle East and North Africa 1964-1965," Europa Publications Limited, p. 134.

<sup>8</sup>"Cyprus," Great Britain, British Information Services, p. 19.

<sup>9</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 361.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 362.

<sup>11</sup>"Cyprus," Statesman's Year Book 1965-66, p. 506.



maintain her standard of living. The volume of foreign trade has risen greatly in the past decade. Cyprus imports food (17 percent of total imports), manufactured goods 37 percent, machinery and equipment 24 percent, and fuel 7 percent.<sup>12</sup>

Most of the trade is carried out with the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. Since independence in 1960, Cyprus has signed bilateral trading agreements with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.<sup>13</sup>

Nicosia is the business center of Cyprus, with the ports of Famagusta, Limassol, and Larnaca playing a secondary role. The lack of a good deep water port has long been considered a deterrent to Cypriot trade, however, improvements to these ports are underway.

Economic viability should be of vital concern to the Cypriot people, but the two major ethnic communities have not been able to resume their spirit of cooperation since the crisis of 1963, and the economy has begun to atrophy as described by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus:<sup>14</sup>

The life and economy of the island remain disrupted and abnormal, and it would be unrealistic to expect any radical improvement until a basic political solution can be found. In the meantime, while in certain areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots, the Government administrative and other services have no access, UNFICYP continues its complex task of providing good offices and acting as the

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<sup>12</sup>A. Araouzos, "Cyprus Foreign Trade," International Relations, No. 5, Apr. 1964, pp. 103-108.

<sup>13</sup>"Basic Data on the Economy of Cyprus," US Dept of Commerce, p. 12.

<sup>14</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/6102, pp. 77-78.

link and channel of communication between two communities which arbitrarily and irrationally have cut themselves off from normal communication with another. In my opinion this task, in the absence of progress toward a political solution, will inevitably become an increasingly static one, and in terms of a return to normal conditions before long will begin to produce steadily diminishing results. The kind of stalemate which will surely result from such a situation will be the more undesirable for continuing to have within it the seeds of a relapse into chaos.



## CHAPTER 4

### POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO 1960

The developments which led to the present acute form of the Cyprus problem date back to the day Great Britain took over administration of the island.

Ever since, the Cypriot demand for freedom was repeatedly voiced by every available means of public expression. Attempts to bring the dream of enosis to reality were vividly implanted in the minds of the Greek Cypriots. The issue had reached grave international proportions and by 1955 it was apparent that the status of Cyprus must be determined.

Conflicting political currents forced the British Government to work out a solution, while still guaranteeing the British strategic requirements on Cyprus. The political problems and violence which became widespread on the island brought NATO into the picture and eventual settlement came about in granting Cyprus her independence in 1960.

### CYPRUS UNDER BRITAIN

Following the inauguration of the British administration in 1878, the island received a Constitution. This Constitution set up a legislative council made up of nine Greeks, three Turks, and six nominated English officials, while the High Commissioner, a Britisher, possessed the veto. From the very beginning, the Greek and Turkish

elected members were at odds with each other.<sup>1</sup>

Under their new masters the Cypriots had many reasons to be dissatisfied with their new conditions, especially in the case of "The Turkish Tribute." This annual tribute, amounting to approximately \$260,000, was to be raised by the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks, and was to be paid to Turkey for the loss of Cyprus. Turkey never received a penny from this tribute, the money being retained in Britain for other purposes unrelated to Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> The result was a severe drain on the island's economy and a smouldering hatred of the British.

The Cypriots consistently expressed their desire for national freedom and self-determination, but the reply was always in the negative.

In 1930, economic depression aggravated by unemployment, crushing taxation and appalling poverty, left Cyprus seething with discontent. This general discontent and the denial of all rights to freedom reached its apex in 1931 when all the Greek members of the Legislative Council resigned in protest. Their resignation was followed by a rising of the people demanding union with Greece. The rising was quelled by British military intervention, while ecclesiastical and political leaders of the people were deported or confined, hundreds of Cypriots were imprisoned or killed. What scanty constitutional

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<sup>1</sup>Sir George Francis Hill, The History of Cyprus, pp. 416-440.

<sup>2</sup>"The Economy of Cyprus Under British Rule," A Cyprus Pocket Book, pp. 5-15.



rights existed were immediately abolished and the Legislative Council was dissolved.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of the so-called "Revolt" of 1931, the power to legislate was vested in the Governor.

#### THE ENOSIS MOVEMENT

The movement among the Greek population for the union (enosis) through self-determination of Cyprus with Greece had been a constant feature of local political life in the British period. This idea of union with Greece was expressed by the Bishop of Kytion, Nikodemos, in his manifesto of 17 October 1931, proclaiming:<sup>4</sup>

That our only salvation from all points of view is our national liberation, which is to be pursued by getting united with Mother Greece. The foreign ruler to whom and to whose illegal laws we owe no obedience must be made to clear out from our country, for the sake of his own purification, this abomination which is called English occupation and administration of Cyprus.

In the years that followed, a number of attempts were made to settle the political problems of the island by offering self-government to the Cypriots. These were unsuccessful. The Greek Cypriot population among whom the movement of enosis is strong, could not accept any constitutional development which did not provide for enosis. Enosis was unacceptable to the Turkish minority.<sup>5</sup>

The Cypriot Greeks were disappointed, despite the fact that both

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<sup>3</sup>Zenon Rossides, The Problem of Cyprus, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup>Hill, op. cit., pp. 546-547.

<sup>5</sup>T. W. Adams and A. J. Cotrell, "The Cyprus Conflict," Orbis, Vol. 8, Spring 1964, pp. 70-71.

the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter guaranteed to all people the right to self-determination.

The demand grew for union and only union with Greece. The British remained impassive to their demands. In 1949, Makarios II, who had become locum tenens at the suggestion of the Ethnarchy Council, proclaimed an open plebiscite to determine the will of the people for union with Greece. The plebiscite was held on 15 January 1950. The vote expressed the desire of the majority of Cypriots for enosis. The British Government and the Turkish minority, opposed to the island's union with Greece, blocked any such action, and the movement for enosis became more violent.<sup>6</sup> The plebiscite was of great political importance and received worldwide publicity.

The leadership in the struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece, or self-determination, had now been taken up by Makarios III, who succeeded Makarios II in 1950.

The political and diplomatic struggle continued, until Greece took the question to the United Nations in 1954 and again in 1955; and the issue of self-determination remained on the agenda for the next four years.

#### PARTITION

When Cyprus became the subject of international concern in 1954, and as the Cypriot campaign for enosis gained in strength and terror,

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<sup>6</sup>"Cyprus Demands Self-Determination," Royal Greek Embassy Information Service, p. 14.



Turkey decided that the now warring Greek and Turkish Cypriots could no longer live together even under British rule. Turkey, therefore, proposed partition (taksim), which remains the Turkish position today as the only solution to the Cyprus problem.<sup>7</sup>

The Turks have a keen concern for the land of Cyprus, quite apart from the large Turkish minority there. The Turks, without any doubt are absolutely determined about Cyprus. They will never, even at the risk of war, permit union with Greece, or even Greek domination of the island.

The Turkish Cypriots suggested that Cyprus be partitioned along the 35th parallel, splitting the island into two regions, the Turkish and the Greek.<sup>8</sup>

Acts of violence against the Greek minority in Turkey and attacks against the Greek Cypriots continued.

Partition is a practical impossibility in Cyprus where in no part of the island are the Turks in a majority. This being so, there is no part of Cyprus in which there could be a separate plebiscite.

Economically, partition is not feasible in practice. The island is too small in size and forms a single economic, social, and political unit which cannot be split. Turkish interests are closely intertwined with and dependent on those of the Greeks.

Suffice it to say that partitioning, even where it could be applied--Ireland, Palestine, Korea, Vietnam, Kashmir, etc., has been

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<sup>7</sup>"Turkish Stand on Cyprus," New York Times, 18 Jun. 1958, p. 32.

<sup>8</sup>Charles Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 100.

an utter failure and has perpetuated conflict and unrest.<sup>9</sup>

### STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

The United Kingdom was to work throughout for a solution which would reconcile the interests of all parties, but the Cyprus problem had been deeply complicated by British strategic requirements in defense of the Free World, the presence of a large Turkish minority, and Turkish conviction that the island is essential to Turkey's own defense.

In view of the Turkish involvement with both Cyprus and NATO, and in face of growing unrest, the Prime Minister of England, Sir Anthony Eden, in July 1955, invited Greece and Turkey to a tripartite conference in London.<sup>10</sup> Some declarations made by Sir Anthony Eden on the necessity of preserving the status quo in Cyprus, unleashed a violent anti-British campaign in Greece, and the Constitution proposed by London shortly afterward was rejected by both Greek and Turkish parties.

The Greek Cypriots pursued a dynamic policy in the hope of accomplishing their goals. A campaign of terrorism against British soldiers and civilians was carried on in Cyprus by the E.O.K.A. (National Organization of Cypriot Struggle), a secret military organization led by Colonel George Grivas (Dighenis), a Cypriot-born military leader and former Greek Army officer. The organization's policy was

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<sup>9</sup>"The Cyprus Question," Institute of Greek American Historical Studies, pp. 12-13.

<sup>10</sup>"Cyprus," Background to Enosis, pp. 14-15.



to prosecute its aims by force of arms. The terrorists attacked British personnel and buildings. A leading part in the planning of this organization was taken by Archbishop Makarios III.<sup>11</sup>

The long term objective of E.O.K.A. was to bring about enosis; while the short term objectives were:

1. To keep the Cyprus problem in the world news.
2. Make the government of the island by the British as difficult as possible.
3. Terrorize the entire population and eliminate opponents to the policy of enosis.<sup>12</sup>

The rebellion started slowly, but in approximately six months gained in momentum to a point where a state of emergency was declared by the Governor in 1955, which lasted for four years.

During this period terrorism was rampant and Greece and Turkey grew further apart.

In 1956 Archbishop Makarios was accused of connivance with the members of E.O.K.A., arrested and deported to the Seychelles Islands. In protest against this, the Greek Government withdrew its ambassador from London. Terrorist activities continued and increased.<sup>13</sup>

The Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus formed their own terrorist organization to counterbalance E.O.K.A. This organization was known as T.M.T. (Turkish Defense Organization). Communal blood-letting became widespread. Between 1955-1959, six hundred and fifty lives were lost, half of them Greek Cypriots, the rest English and

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<sup>11</sup>DA Pam 550-22, pp. 213-214.

<sup>12</sup>"Cyprus EOKA's Campaign of Terror," Great Britain Central Office of Information, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup>Foley, op. cit., pp. 46-52.

Turkish Cypriots.<sup>14</sup>

Deportation of Makarios aggravated the internal chaos on Cyprus, for he was the only person through whom any sort of rapprochement could be attained.

The Secretary-General of NATO began to urge in public that the feuding Allies get together once again so that the eastern flank of the West's collective security arrangement might be stabilized.

#### NATO'S EFFORT FOR MEDIATION IN 1956

After the 11th session of the General Assembly in 1956, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization recognized that there was little hope for a settlement of the Cyprus problem in the U.N. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization in December 1956, passed a resolution that it would make the "good offices" of its Secretary-General available for conciliation on the peaceful settlement of disputes.<sup>15</sup>

Both the British and Turks were receptive to the idea. The Greek Government rejected the intervention of NATO and insisted upon the return of Archbishop Makarios to Cyprus, and the abolition of the emergency regulations before any negotiations could commence, adding that such negotiations must in any case proceed between the British and Makarios as sole representative of the Greek people of Cyprus.

In 1958 clashes between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus continued unabated and NATO allies Greece and Turkey grew further apart.

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<sup>14</sup>Alastos Doros, Cyprus Guerrilla, p. 7.

<sup>15</sup>Adams and Cotrell, op. cit., pp. 72-74.



In the meantime, concerned with the unity of the alliance on account of a dangerous situation created by a British Plan, known as the MacMillan Plan, which was rejected by the Athens Government on the grounds that the plan contained elements which would divide the Cypriot people, Secretary-General Paul Henri Spaak took the initiative of going to Athens in 1958 to discuss the whole problem.<sup>16</sup>

On his return to Paris, the Secretary-General reported to the NATO Council the results of his visit to Athens, and submitted a proposal involving amendments to the MacMillan Plan. He requested that it be accepted in principle immediately, with a conference between Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to follow, to discuss the details.

The Spaak Plan was similar to the MacMillan Plan in that it proposed two separate houses of representatives, one for each community on Cyprus, both of which would advise and aid the British governor for a period of seven years. The British delayed acceptance of the Spaak Plan and after a month Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom made concessions and finally agreed to a future conference.

When Britain's Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd, made a speech in England on 9 October 1958, in which he declared "Cyprus is Turkey's offshore island," and the Turkish Government on 24 October denied a statement in the New York Times that she "has given up the claim for partition," the Greek Government on 24 October instructed its NATO representative that "Greece would take no further steps, seeing that her efforts and concessions had not met with the least response."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>C. L. Sulzberger, "First Political Intervention by NATO," New York Times, 22 Oct. 1958, p. 34.

<sup>17</sup>DA Pam 550-22, pp. 222-223.

Thus, by November the NATO talks had broken down. The breakdown of communal relations on Cyprus has seriously strained relations between Greece and Turkey and to the peril of the West, has jeopardized NATO security in the area.

When the NATO talks failed it became clear that the only possible solution was to make Cyprus an independent republic.

### THE ZURICH-LONDON AGREEMENTS

The breakdown of the NATO talks and the tragic situation that prevailed on the island led to a Tripartite Conference between Britain, Greece, and Turkey. These bilateral talks led to the signing of the Zurich-London Agreements on 19 February 1959, the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problems of Cyprus. Eventually these agreements were embodied in the Treaties of Alliance, Guarantee, and Treaty of Establishment and the Constitution to be signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960.<sup>18</sup>

The United Kingdom, as the colonial power and also one with strategic interests in the island, along with Greece and Turkey, claimed a vital stake in the drafting and outcome of the Zurich-London Agreements. The interests of these parties brought to the Cyprus problem a complexity of issues going beyond any immediate question of the well-being of the Cypriot people.

The Zurich-London Agreements are a series of compromise

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<sup>18</sup>"U. N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," United Nations Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, Apr. 1964, p. 5.



interlocking agreements between the Governments of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the Cypriot leaders. The basic agreement provided for the independent Republic of Cyprus, is the provision for a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, each to be elected by universal suffrage every five years by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively. Executive power is vested in the President and Vice President in union with the Council of Ministers. The President and Vice President share separately and jointly the power of final veto over legislation and decisions of the Council of Ministers on foreign affairs and defense and security matters.<sup>19</sup>

The Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey included arrangements for a Cypriot Army and a tripartite defense headquarters to which Greek and Turkish forces would be attached.

The Treaty of Guarantee stipulated that the future Republic would not participate in any union with any state and to prohibit all activity tending to promote either such union or partition of the island. The three countries gave similar undertakings with regard to Cyprus, and might take action jointly or singly to ensure that these provisions were observed.

Under the Treaty of Establishment a principal military feature was the retention by Great Britain of sovereign rights over two 99 square mile military bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia. These bases were

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<sup>19</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 224.

to be built and equipped by Britain to accommodate up to 20,000 men. The air base at Akrotiri is capable of handling modern jet bombers.<sup>20</sup>

Following the conclusion of the Cyprus Agreement, immediate steps were taken by the Cyprus Government to bring about a return to normal conditions in the island and to facilitate the work of transition. The deportation orders made against Makarios were revoked and amnesty granted to all members of the EOKA and TMT.

The Zurich-London Agreements were received by the Greeks of Cyprus with keen disappointment. Their aspirations had not been realized and their fighting and sacrifices had gone unrewarded.

Rights were granted to the Turkish minority as an equal community beyond those needed for its protection. The Cyprus Greeks consider the rights of the Turks disproportionate and this has been the cause of disagreement between the Turkish minority and the Greek people of Cyprus.<sup>21</sup>

The Greek Cypriots tried unsuccessfully to amend the agreements of the Constitution prior to their adoption in 1960. Their continued effort in this regard after independence led to another serious conflict which is discussed later in this paper.

The declaration of Cyprus as an independent state, the Republic of Cyprus, took place on 16 August 1960. Archbishop Makarios, who returned to the island, had earlier been elected by the Cypriot people to the first President of the new Republic, with Dr. Fasil Kutchuk

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<sup>20</sup>T. W. Adams, "Crisis in Cyprus," Army, Vol. 15, Sep. 1964, pp. 32-33.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 26-34.



leader of the Turkish community as Vice President.<sup>22</sup> Cyprus became a member of the United Nations shortly thereafter and was admitted to the British commonwealth of nations in March 1961.

The Zurich-London Agreements ended the four-year emergency period. The Greeks did not gain enosis, the Turks could not win partition, and the British lost another jewel to their imperial crown. Therefore, the Cyprus agreements satisfied no one, and the source of the current problem lies in the Constitution. Unfortunately, the solution to the Cyprus problem was destined to be relatively short-lived.

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<sup>22</sup>C. Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus, p. 72.

## CHAPTER 5

### PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE

#### THE CONSTITUTION

The Republic of Cyprus achieved its independence on 16 August 1960. The Constitution which was drafted within the rigid framework of the Zurich and London Agreements became the fundamental law of the Republic of Cyprus. The Constitution, containing 199 Articles, is intricate, long, and complicated, and contributes to the political confusion of the island.

The Constitution "recognized and perpetuated the historic separateness of the two ethnic communities of the island."<sup>1</sup>

The Turkish minority had rights which were far in excess of their numerical strength and, by establishing a system of checks and balances to protect their interests, gave them virtually a veto over any legislation they wanted to disapprove.<sup>2</sup>

It quickly became clear that the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus had not resolved the many problems between the two ethnic communities. In most instances it had added new fuel to old quarrels. The Government, consisting of a Greek President, a Turkish Vice President, and an ethnically divided House of Representatives, could not agree on such basic problems as the formulation of an Army, the

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<sup>1</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 237.

<sup>2</sup>J. King Gordon, "The U. N. in Cyprus," International Journal, Vol. XIX, Summer 1964, p. 329.



division of civil service jobs between Greeks and Turks, the establishment of a security force, or the administration of the Republic's five main municipalities. The three years of independence were a stalemate, and any attempts by the courts to solve the issues were not honored.<sup>3</sup>

In October 1963, there was a deterioration of relations between the two Cypriot communities. The President and Vice President of the Government no longer held talks, and they exacerbated the situation by public statements and counterstatements while an irresponsible press aired extreme views on both sides.<sup>4</sup>

#### PRESIDENT PROPOSES AMENDMENTS

On 30 November 1963, President Makarios set forth thirteen points on which he considered that the Constitution should be amended. He did so on the grounds that in its existing form the Constitution created many difficulties in the smooth functioning of the State, and the development and progress of the country, and that its many provisions conflicted with internationally accepted democratic principles and created sources of friction between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots; and that its defects were causing the two communities to draw further apart.

Among his thirteen point proposals, Makarios proposed to remove the power of veto now held by the Turkish members of the national assembly.

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<sup>3</sup>William M. Dobell, "A Respite for Cyprus," Behind the Headlines, Vol. 24, Feb. 1965, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 287.

Under the Constitution, as few as eight Turkish deputies can block any law imposing duties or taxes related to the municipalities. The Assembly is made up of 50 members, 35 Greek and 15 Turk, elected separately by the two communities.<sup>5</sup>

Makarios also proposed to do away with the power to veto any executive decision of the cabinet by the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President.

The division between the two communities is further accentuated by the constitutional provision for separate municipalities by the Turkish Cypriots in five of the main towns of the Republic. Makarios proposed united municipalities with a provision that the Turkish Cypriots have fair representation in the municipal councils and that an equitable amount of the annual budget be earmarked for the Turkish sector of each town.<sup>6</sup>

Another provision in the Constitution provides for two separate communal assemblies with jurisdiction over all matters of religion, education, and cultural affairs. Makarios proposed to abolish the Greek Communal Assembly but was willing to accept some kind of a Turkish Communal Chamber.

The proposed amendments were sent to Vice President Kutchuk and before he had a chance to voice an opinion on the proposals, the Turkish Government came back with an immediate rejection. By this act, the Ankara Government committed itself to the protection

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<sup>5</sup>"The Cyprus Question," The Institute of Greek American Historical Studies, p. 22.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 23-28.



of the Turkish Cypriot's constitutional guarantees.<sup>7</sup>

#### INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 1963-64

Proposals by Makarios to amend the Constitution increased the Greek-Turkish antagonism, both on Cyprus and on the mainland:

Out of the thirteen amendments to the Constitution demanded by Makarios, eleven are practical and workmanlike alterations to an unworkable Constitution. Moderate Turks will admit that only two of the thirteen amendments are basically unfair to the Turkish minority and would place them in a helpless position. Given good will on both sides, there was a possibility that the thirteen points might have been negotiated without bloodshed. It is now too late.<sup>8</sup>

Fighting broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia on 21 December 1963, and soon spread to other parts of the island. Both sides had been storing weapons for such an event, procured from Greece and Turkey, respectively.

On 25 December Turkish jet fighter planes buzzed Cypriot cities as a warning, while units of the Turkish fleet steamed toward the island.<sup>9</sup> Turkey threatened to take unilateral action against the Greek Cypriots. Greece moved her naval forces to the southern Aegean.<sup>10</sup> World peace was threatened by the possibility that the Greek majority would risk intervention by Turkey, and by the danger of war between the major powers of the Western Alliance in their determination to

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<sup>7</sup>T. W. Adams, "Crisis in Cyprus," Army, Vol. 15, Sep. 1964, p. 33.

<sup>8</sup>"Cyprus," Intelligence Digest, Feb. 1964, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Lawrence Fellows, "Turkish Soldiers Based on Cyprus Join in the Fighting," New York Times, 26 Dec. 1963, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 418.

enforce their will on the Turkish minority.<sup>11</sup> A conflict between Turkey and Greece could shatter the entire NATO Alliance and open the Russian path to the south.

Britain, Greece, and Turkey were committed by treaty to uphold the Cypriot Constitution. The Greek and Turkish regular forces stationed on Cyprus were dug in at strategic positions in support of the respective Cypriot communities.

The British troops on the island were unable to persuade the Greek and Turkish troops to return to their bases and were patrolling the island on their own.

A suggestion from Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom alleviated the situation when they agreed that their forces stationed on the island be placed under British command, and assist the Cypriot authorities in securing a cease fire. The Cypriot Government promptly accepted.<sup>12</sup> British troops took up positions along a neutral corridor through Nicosia to separate the Greek and Turkish factions. British soldiers blocked all streets leading from the Greek into the Turkish section.

#### THE UNITED STATES INTERVENES

Meanwhile, Admiral Charles D. Griffin, CINC, US Naval Forces, Europe, ordered Admiral James S. Russell, the American Commander of

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<sup>11</sup>Michael Wall, "Cyprus Island of Hate and Fear," New York Times Magazine, 8 Mar. 1964, p. 96.

<sup>12</sup>"U. N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," United Nations Review, Vol. 11, Apr. 1964, p. 6.



NATO Forces in Europe and the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet into the stormy waters off Cyprus. His orders were to show the flag and to arrive with such timing and discretion that its presence near Cyprus would prevent war between the United States Allies, Greece, and Turkey. President Johnson, at the same time, dispatched General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to Ankara and Athens in the hope of seeking a peaceful solution and to prevent a showdown. The personal visit by General Lemnitzer staved off a Turkish intervention until the United States could propose a plan to settle conditions on the island.<sup>13</sup>

Under the proposed plan, the United States offered to send 1200 combat troops to Cyprus along with support troops to maintain a 10,000 man NATO peace force. The Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, after visiting London, Athens, and Ankara, and with their backing on the plan presented it to Makarios at Nicosia. After three days of talks, President Makarios persisted that the United Nations should look into the situation as it was his belief that through Afro-Asian support he could obtain a favorable resolution favoring the Greek Cypriot plan to abrogate the 1959 agreements and condemn outside interference in Cypriot affairs.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, outbreaks of violence continued on the island and observers reported large scale clandestine movements of men and arms into Cyprus by both Turkey and Greece. Hand in hand with the arms

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<sup>13</sup>Charles Foley, Legacy of Strife, p. 175.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 176.

build-up came an intensification of the Greek Cypriots' attempt to consolidate military supremacy over the island.

The collapse of Mr. Ball's mission to Cyprus required a quick reassessment of Anglo-American policy. Just prior to an appeal being made to the UN by the Cypriot representative, Great Britain seized the political initiative and on 16 January 1964, requested an early meeting of the Security Council to consider the crisis. Shortly thereafter, Cyprus requested an emergency meeting of the Council.<sup>15</sup>

The scene thus shifted to New York and the United Nations.

#### THE UNITED NATIONS ACTS

The Security Council held ten meetings between the period 18 February and 4 March 1964, to debate the Cyprus question. Council deliberations appeared doomed to becoming an impasse, but five non-permanent members of the Council came up with a draft resolution that received unanimous vote.<sup>16</sup>

On 4 March, the Security Council unanimously approved the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force and the appointment of a mediator:

for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, bearing in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>United Nations, General Assembly Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/5801), pp. 32-23.

<sup>16</sup>Gordon, op. cit., pp. 334-335.

<sup>17</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5575, pp. 1-2.



The force was to be stationed in Cyprus for a period of three months, and all costs were to be borne by the states providing contingents and by the Government of Cyprus on a voluntary contribution basis.

The Secretary-General established the UNFICYP at an initial strength of approximately seven thousand, and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Cyprus were advised accordingly. Troop contingents were requested initially from Austria, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.<sup>18</sup> The United States was not requested to send any troops.

Problems of transportation and financial support delayed the dispatch of the United Nations Force. Meanwhile, Turkey complained that more Turkish Cypriots were being massacred every day by fresh outbreaks of fighting, and that the entire Turkish Cypriot population would be annihilated before the arrival of UNFICYP.

At the same time, Greek Cypriots complained that the Turkish Cypriots were intensifying their attacks on the Greeks in order to encourage an invasion from the Turkish mainland. Turkish troops were reported to be embarking at a port on the southern coast of Turkey, and Greek forces were reported standing by in Greek ships near Cyprus.<sup>19</sup>

Secretary-General U Thant appealed to all parties involved to exercise all their influence toward halting violence and bloodshed.

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<sup>18</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5593, pp. 1-3.

<sup>19</sup>"Cyprus," Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 13-20 Jun. 1964, p. 20120.

The Security Council held an emergency night session on 12 March. This meeting ended with the assurance that UNFICYP would be established without further delay, and elements would soon be deployed to Cyprus. The immediate danger of war had been averted.

The first small contingent of UNFICYP, consisting of Canadian troops, was flown to Cyprus on 13 and 30 March.

When UNFICYP became operational, the situation in Cyprus was relatively quiet with only sporadic shooting incidents. In May of 1964 it was apparent that the U. N. Force had acquired the respect of the Cypriots. Stationing of the blue-bereted U. N. troops between Greek and Turkish armed positions had limited the fighting.<sup>20</sup>

The intervention in Cyprus by the United Nations was the beginning of a new phase in the Cyprus situation. The U. N. now became involved in a dispute which was fundamentally an internal constitutional crisis, and assumed responsibility for peacekeeping operations. The future status of Cyprus now became an issue for debate in the U. N.

When the UNFICYP landed they found a number of problems in the divided Republic of Cyprus, and there have been only modest advances toward reducing them. The problems that still face the U. N. forces are the widely armed members of both communities throughout the island, Turkish refugees who have concentrated in defensible areas, the uncrossable "green lines" separating Greeks and Turks in the

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<sup>20</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5679, p. 4.



larger cities, and the uncompromising positions of the Greeks and Turks, who seek vastly different political solutions of the island.<sup>21</sup>

In June of 1965, after the fifth three month period of the stationing of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus drew to a close, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States pledged their Governments' support for the United Nations operation in Cyprus and supported the suggestion that the mandate of the Force be extended to 26 December 1965. The draft resolution was unanimously adopted.<sup>22</sup>

Under the auspices of the peacekeeping force the island remained relatively quiet during the period from March 1964 to 5 August 1964. On 5 August a large scale offensive broke out. Government forces supported by medium artillery, armored cars and armed patrol boats operating off shore, launched an attack on Turkish Cypriots manning positions on the northern coastal area. On the second day of the attack Turkish planes began attacking the government forces. The Security Council met and adopted a resolution calling for an immediate cease fire by all concerned. The cease fire was accepted and became effective on 9 August 1964.<sup>23</sup> Once again the lid was put on the powder key.

As a result U. N. forces might be on Cyprus for a long time to come, for it is very likely that without UNFICYP there would be an

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<sup>21</sup>Jack Citrin, United Nations Peacekeeping Activities, pp. 58-59.

<sup>22</sup>United Nations, General Assembly Official Records: Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/60011), p. 19.

<sup>23</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5868, p. 1.

early recurrence of serious fighting.

#### COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CYPRUS

The basic aims of international communism in Cyprus are no different from those which it pursues elsewhere in Europe; politically, the weakening of NATO; economically, the disruption of the economic life of all parts of the Free Western World.

Soon after independence, not many things moved so fast in Cyprus as the spread of Communist influence. The Soviet Union and its satellites immediately established diplomatic relations with Cyprus, and commercial relations followed soon thereafter. A commercial aviation link between Nicosia and Moscow was approved.

The Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) founded in 1941 is numerically the strongest organized political force on the island. It is shrewdly run and organized on all levels by a long term Marxist and in 1963 claimed a party membership of 10,500, almost entirely of Greek Cypriots. The real Communist strength lies in the Pan-Cyprian Labor Federation, which has approximately 42,000 members.<sup>24</sup>

AKEL holds to the Communist Party line as determined in Moscow and works openly with the Soviet Union. The party plays a very careful game, expressing solidarity with the Greek Cypriot population in their struggle against the Turks, while supporting a completely independent Republic, free from all international alliances and free from British bases. In addition, they give Makarios full support in

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<sup>24</sup>DA Pam 550-22, pp. 406-407.



his demands for the abrogation of the treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, claiming they prevent the Cypriots from choosing their political future.

In 1960, the AKEL Party was granted five of the thirty-five Greek Cypriot seats in the House of Representatives, and was awarded three of the twenty-six seats in the Greek Communal Chamber.<sup>25</sup>

Under barter contracts agreed upon in 1960, the Soviet Union announced it would buy the entire year's crop of raisins and a portion of the citrus crop in exchange for cement and timber. Subsequently, the Soviet Union concluded a barter agreement which provides for more than two million in exchange of goods, and offered thirty million in credit. In addition, a Polish firm is expanding the port facilities at Famagusta. Commercial and economic agreements have been worked out with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.<sup>26</sup>

The bewildered citizens of the island of Cyprus, not united by any real feeling of patriotism, and dismayed by worsening economic conditions, are giving increasing support to a skillfully organized local Communist movement. Many of them are not Communist, but they are helping communism and improving the image of AKEL.

As the Cypriots accept more and more support from the Soviet Union, the Communists will steadily gain in respectability, with a commensurate decline in the fortunes of the non-Communist political

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<sup>25</sup>Lawrence Fellows, "Communists Score Big Gains in Cyprus," New York Times, 6 Sep. 1961, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>DA Pam 550-22, pp. 206-298.

movements of a nationalist character.<sup>27</sup>

Should Cyprus get complete independence, the Cyprus Government's policy will become more and more responsive to Moscow both through trade agreements and the necessity to pay off the political debts that are now accumulating. It will be the same old story of slow rot from within.

The current eruption of intercommunal violence has done little to curb the growth of Cypriot communism, since the official press organs of AKEL are free to publish inflammatory articles, which medium certainly is a most effective mold of public opinion. "Their slogans have been 'Liquidate the Aftermath of Colonialism' and 'Attain Full National Independence'."<sup>28</sup>

Makarios hopes to retire soon to strictly ecclesiastical affairs. Unless the tide of communism is reversed before he steps down as President, he might be Cyprus's last non-Communist chief of state. Moscow's system once established is hard to unseat, yet in Cyprus it could come by legal democratic means.

It is going to be difficult enough for Cyprus to become a viable organism in the complex modern world, one may therefore hope it does not add to its existing load of problems, that of democratically electing a Communist regime.

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<sup>27</sup>"The Powers Behind the Throne," The Economist, 11 Jan. 1964, pp. 104-105.

<sup>28</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 407.



## CHAPTER 6

### THE SECURITY FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC

Cyprus has little in the way of military tradition, other than partisan and guerrilla operations. In all the long history of Cyprus there has never been a full strength, battle-ready army. Prior to independence in 1960, no Cypriot army was provided for as the security of the island was maintained by the British police force.

As a Republic, the forces as stipulated in the Zurich-London Agreements, were to consist of an army and a security force, each having a strength of two thousand men, all divided according to Greek and Turkish Cypriot quotas.

#### POLICE AND GENDARMERIE

The security force consisted of the police force and the gendarmerie. Relative strengths of the forces were about 1150 for the police and 850 for the gendarmerie.

Cyprus had no navy or coast guard so the duties of regulation of shipping, enforcement of custom regulations, harbor rescue and patrol tasks came under the police. With a 54-man Port and Marine Branch operating motor launches they patrolled the harbors of Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, and Kyrenia.<sup>1</sup>

Under normal conditions, the police and gendarmerie were capable

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<sup>1</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 382.

of maintaining law and order. However, in 1963 when violence erupted over governmental operations and the government split into two opposing communal factions, so did the rank and file members of the police and gendarmerie, and the effectiveness of the two forces vanished.

#### THE ARMY

The two thousand man army provided for in the 1960 Constitution of the Republic has never materialized.<sup>2</sup>

The role of an army was not so apparent as were the security forces of the police and gendarmerie. Members of the government questioned the expenditure of funds for any army since Britain, Greece, and Turkey had guaranteed Cyprus independence.

The army was to be sixty percent Greek and forty percent Turkish Cypriots. It was nearly a year later before the first group of 350 men were enlisted in the Cypriot army.<sup>3</sup>

The pay and allowances of the army were about half those of the police and gendarmerie. Consequently, morale suffered and a year later near mutiny broke out.

The army never reached an effective military force due to lack of arms, transportation, and communications. It was no more than a cadre in training when violence broke out in 1963 and the army

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<sup>2</sup>Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich Agreement," The World Today, Vol. 20, No. 8, Aug. 1964, pp. 338-347.

<sup>3</sup>DA Pam 550-22, p. 385.



disintegrated and its volunteered members joined themselves to the private forces which appeared on both sides.

#### GOVERNMENT ARMED FORCES

It was in November of 1963 that President Makarios announced his proposed changes in the Constitution, which included revamping the security forces. After violence erupted in December, the Greek Cypriot Minister of the Interior was put in command of all irregular and private armies. This group was to be incorporated into the security forces of the Republic as an auxiliary police force for the emergency. On 26 February 1964, Makarios announced that approval had been given for a temporary increase of up to five thousand men in what he called "the special police."<sup>4</sup> Enlistment was to be voluntary and without pay. The Interior Minister called the new force the National Guard, which was to restore law and order in conjunction with the United Nations Force.

The National Guard grew in manpower and has become increasingly professional, resulting in improved standards of discipline. The total number of conscripts in the guard as of June 1965, is now estimated at approximately sixteen thousand men.<sup>5</sup>

Training of Cypriot troops is being accomplished by officers of the Greek National Army, and includes the use of tanks, armoured

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<sup>4</sup>W. Granger Blair, "Cyprus Expands Security Forces," New York Times, 26 Feb. 1964, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/6426, p. 12.

personnel carriers, and guns including AA guns, which were brought to the island in the early part of 1965, introduced through the port of Boghaz, 16 miles north of Famagusta. Some of this equipment was brought in without notifying UNFICYP, as required by agreement.<sup>6</sup>

With the acquisition of modern weapons, including 32 T-34 Soviet medium tanks, six Soviet Comar class 55-knot torpedo boats, a sizeable quantity of antiaircraft guns and heavy equipment from Russia, and with the training of personnel in their use, the National Guard has acquired a substantial striking power, which is continuously growing in effectiveness.<sup>7</sup> The large scale acquisition of military transport has given the National Guard the ability to reinforce any area of the island, and has improved its operational mobility.

The National Guard has devoted much effort to the island's coastal defenses, and to improving defense systems in sensitive areas, constructing new fortifications, including fortifications in depth. Government leaders have made no secret of the fact that certain types of surface-to-air missiles have been purchased abroad.<sup>8</sup> It becomes apparent that the National Guard, in the near future, will be strong enough to stabilize the island's political problems through force and be able to repel armed intervention from abroad on a limited war scale.

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<sup>6</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/6228, p. 12.

<sup>7</sup>W. Granger Blair, "Makarios Says Cyprus Has Russian Equipment," New York Times, 30 Mar. 1965, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup>John M. Goshko, "Rocket Sites Being Built on Cyprus," New York Times, 20 Mar. 1964, p. A1.



### TURKISH CYPRIOT ARMED ELEMENTS

The strength of the Turkish Cypriot armed elements is approximately twelve thousand, whose leadership is generally identified with the (TMT) Turkish Defense Organization, has become an established and increasingly influential segment of the Turkish Cypriot community at all levels.<sup>9</sup>

Their armaments are limited to conventional types of light and heavy infantry weapons supplied by Turkey.<sup>10</sup> Training is carried out under field conditions. It may be assumed that the Turkish Cypriot fighters are less well equipped than their National Guard counterparts.

It is considered that although the situation remains relatively quiet, it remains so largely because of the sobering influence of UNFICYP, which remains deployed in all the potential trouble spots of the Republic of Cyprus.

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<sup>9</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Document S/6102, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup>United Nations, Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 1, No. 4, Aug.-Sep. 1964, p. 12.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### CONCLUSIONS

Although Cyprus has been relatively free of violence in the last few months, under the supervision of a United Nations peace force, relations between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots remain tense.

The villagers had lived and worked in relative peaceful conditions for many years before hate, fear, and mistrust swept the island with the outbreak of communal violence in 1963.

Since then the two communities have lived apart, and have taken no steps to restore communal harmony. The economy has suffered a setback because of this lack of harmony. The trouble with Cyprus today is that there are no Cypriots. Cypriots consider themselves Greeks or Turks.

Even where life appears normal in Cyprus, there is a background of constant uncertainty, recurring tensions, hostility, and distrust. Peace did not come to the island by its independence in 1960, for Turkish and Greek Cypriots are divided in their ideas and how their nation should be governed.

It was an attempt to reduce the minority voice in government that brought a renewal of warfare in 1963. President Makarios had proposed to eliminate the veto power constitutionally held by a



Turkish Cypriot in the Vice Presidency. The Vice President, Dr. Kutchuk, has since been virtually ignored by the government. The 1960 Constitution has been dead since the start of fighting in 1963. Cyprus faces a situation in which neither side can move without things getting out of hand. The lines between the two communities have become frontiers. Makarios has virtually established an unconstitutional dictatorship in Cyprus.

The question of enosis is the most decisive and potentially the most explosive aspect of the Cyprus problem. So long as there is a possibility of enosis, no peace agreement will be possible because of the fear it inspires among the Turks.

Any effort to divide the island into Greek and Turkish areas would also bring about a recurrence of serious conflict.

The Government of Cyprus has received a considerable amount of arms and both light and heavy military equipment. Both the warring Greeks and Turkish Cypriot communities are better armed and a renewal of fighting is likely to be more severe than before. This, then, would only serve to make the problem more hazardous and the solution more difficult.

Fighting between Greece and Turkey, two allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, could cause vast damage to the Western Alliance since both Greece and Turkey make substantial contributions to the military strength of the right flank of NATO.

It is concluded that the Republic of Cyprus is important to the security of the United States from a political, military, and psychological point of view.

Politically, the alignment of Cyprus is of vital importance because of its strategic location; it is likely that as Cyprus goes, so goes the Mid-East.

Cyprus has never been ideally suited to the needs of a key defense base; clearly though the intrinsic military value of Cyprus stems from its strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc, combined with the military infrastructure which has been built by the British over the years in its support militarily of the right flank of NATO. The use of Cyprus by the British or the United States as a command post, as an operational air base, as a submarine base, and for certain other military purposes is indispensable to prevent the Communists from taking over the island, and to prevent the Communists from further penetrating into the Middle East. Possession of Cyprus by the Communists would increase United States' difficulties of naval and air defense in the eastern Mediterranean as it could be used for submarines and air operations against the important focal area around the entrance to the Suez Canal.

The real danger from the Communist world is not necessarily one of armed aggression but one of political penetration and infiltration and subversion.

Psychologically, Cyprus is important to the United States because its ideals of freedom and individual liberty parallel that of the United States. We must assist Cyprus in achieving these fundamental values that we hold so dear. In addition, a Western base on Cyprus has a significant impact on the Middle East.



The present political impasse on the island will surely lead to more violence, and the longer the situation remains unsolved, the greater is the menace of communism.

Cyprus is a critical issue for NATO and the entire Free World. The problem of Cyprus may have passed the point of no return. The overriding consideration for any permanent solution to the problem should be its effect on the Western Alliance.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the United States, a great national power, pursue a dynamic strategic policy toward Cyprus in order to enhance United States and Free World positions in the eastern Mediterranean area. We must continue to strive for a political solution to the Cyprus problem, no matter what the cost in resources or criticism. If we try to settle the problem at the expense of someone else, we would irretrievably lose the confidence of all our friends and allies in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

It is recommended that efforts be devoted toward assistance in the formulation of a new set of constitutional laws for Cyprus based upon an international guarantee of the rights of the Turkish minority. A stable form of government must be formed, one capable of maintaining a high standard of internal security, one that will bring the two communities together, and one that will prevent the Communists from gaining a political strangle hold over the island.

Included in the new constitutional laws should be a guarantee for the continued retention of the two British bases on the island. Should


the British be unable to carry the burden of these bases, arrangements should be made for the United States to assist them.

Modern aircraft with nuclear as well as conventional capability operating from Cyprus in conjunction with the United States Sixth Fleet can play an effective role in the defense of all those countries lying along the periphery of the Communist world between the Adriatic and the Caspian Sea. Cyprus is unique as a base directed against the Soviet bloc, for aircraft and land based missiles can strike deep into the heart of Russia. Cyprus also lends itself as a potential base for nuclear Polaris submarines.

Military strength in Cyprus should guarantee that the Middle East will be protected from further Russian penetration, and is essential as a shield and support to the political set-up which is necessary to withstand attack by subversion, infiltration, and political penetration which the Communists are pursuing in Cyprus.

It is recommended that the United Nations forces be retained in Cyprus in strength necessary to maintain law and order and to stop the illegal entry of military arms and equipment.

Cyprus is still of great future military importance to NATO strategy and we cannot shirk our responsibilities as a member of the Western Alliance. Preventing Cyprus from becoming a Levantine Cuba is of utmost importance to the security interests of the United States and the entire Free World.

  
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CDR, U. S. Navy



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


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


# ANNEX A



**■** Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean.









# MAP OF CYPRUS

SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF GREEKS AND TURKS  
BY DISTRICT. CENSUS 1960



REFERENCE  
GREEKS.....G  
TURKS.....T

Prepared in 1964 by the Department of Lands & Surveys  
on the basis of the 1960 Census of Population.